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1 Pensions and healthcare systems and their
coverage in Latin America
This article describes Latin America’s social insurance
systems for pension and healthcare in the context of
the region’s shift in labour with decreasing formal
employment and expanding informality. The analysis
demonstrates that social insurance coverage (on
pensions and healthcare) is higher where informality
is lower and vice versa; identifies key explanatory
factors for low and unequal coverage; and suggests
policy recommendations for expanding coverage. By
way of introduction, this section briefly explains key
features of the pension and healthcare systems and
their coverage in the 20 countries of Latin America
(based on Mesa-Lago 2008a).
All countries have social insurance pensions for old-
age, disability and survivors. Structural reforms in ten
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru
and Uruguay) shifted from the traditional defined
benefit, pay-as-you-go and public administration
(‘public systems’), to defined contribution, fully-
funded individual accounts and private administration
(‘private systems’), albeit with diverse models and
degrees of privatisation. The other ten countries
maintain the traditional public systems and several
have implemented non-structural (‘parametric’)
reforms to strengthen them financially (Brazil, Cuba,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela).1
Pension coverage of the labour force by social
insurance averaged 31 per cent in Latin America in
2004; in the least developed countries coverage
ranged from 9 per cent to 19 per cent. Coverage in
private systems was 26 per cent, compared with 39
per cent in public systems (based on surveys averages
were 36 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively).
Coverage fell in all ten structurally reformed private
systems and the average declined from 38 per cent
before the reform to 26 per cent in 2004.
Most countries in the region have three health sectors: 
z Public, which legally should protect the uninsured
population (the majority in 12 countries) but in
practice seldom accomplish that task, and it is
extremely difficult to estimate the population
with access
z Social insurance sickness and maternity benefits,
comprising a principal programme and often
separate schemes for special labour groups,
covering 41 per cent of the total population but
ranging from 8 per cent to 88 per cent; this is the
main provider in eight countries
z Private, the smallest sector but expanding, which
covers 11.5 per cent of the population ranging
from 1 per cent to 25 per cent in various countries. 
Brazil and Cuba have a public system and no social
insurance; the former also has a sizeable private
sector that is banned in the latter; in Haiti social
insurance is incipient. Healthcare reforms began in
Chile in 1981 and have been implemented in virtually
all countries, albeit with different scope, depth and
speed; most reforms have pursued an expansion of
the private sector. Health coverage of the total
population by social insurance averaged 41 per cent in
2004, a decline from 52 per cent in 1990; in the
least developed countries coverage ranged from
7 per cent to 17 per cent; in 75 per cent of countries
between the reform and 2004 coverage either
stagnated or declined.
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2 Transformation of the labour market and legal
protection
As in most of the world, social insurance in Latin
America was designed for the formal sector of the
economy, essentially urban, with fairly stable
employment and income. Coverage was higher in
those countries with the largest formal sector and the
smallest informal sector that is normally uninsured.
During the economic crisis of the 1980s the formal
sector contracted while the informal sector expanded
– a trend that basically continues and has adversely
affected coverage. This situation has been aggravated
by the ‘flexibilisation’ of the labour market introduced
by neoliberal reforms, which transformed jobs fully
protected by labour and social security legislation into
jobs without contract, part-time or subcontracted, all
devoid of social protection (Tokman 2007).
The definition and scope of the informal sector has
been the subject of discussion for decades and for a
long time was restricted to the urban sector.
Recently, an international agreement was reached to
expand its scope to the rural sector, new more
concrete definitions developed, and an attempt is
underway to elaborate more reliable and comparable
statistics (Chen, in this IDS Bulletin). In Latin America,
data on the informal sector was based on the old
concept of informality and limited to the urban
sector. This article elaborates preliminary new
statistics combining informality in the urban and rural
sectors (unfortunately data from ECLAC are based on
percentages that do not allow merging of the sectors
so estimates are separate). The urban informal sector
(self-employed, unpaid family workers, employees of
microenterprises and domestic servants) increased
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Table 1 Importance of informal labour in Latin America, circa 2005 (%)
Country groups by Informal/urban Self-employed/urban Self-employed and unpaid 
informal labour employed labour force† employed labour force‡ family/rural labour force§
importance*
Low (average) 36.5 18.7 43.3
Chile 28.5 15.0 32.0
Costa Rica 32.4 16.1 24.3
Argentina 37.1 16.7 n.a.
Mexico 38.8 18.9 39.1
Panama 37.0 21.5 58.7
Uruguay 41.2 20.3 n.a.
Brazil 40.5 22.6 62.5
Medium (average) 46.2 34.8 49.6
El Salvador 49.6 32.4 40.5
Dominican Rep. 45.3 34.1 57.2
Colombia 42.6 37.6 56.0
Venezuela 47.4 35.2 44.9
High (average) 56.3 36.3 66.5
Ecuador 51.9 31.6 56.8
Guatemala 51.6 34.5 58.4
Honduras 54.2 36.7 63.0
Nicaragua 55.5 35.4 57.2
Paraguay 55.7 29.5 70.4
Peru 60.0 42.0 80.5
Bolivia 65.4 44.1 79.2
Regional average 46.4 29.1 55.0
*No data available for Cuba and Haiti. †Sum of self-employed, unpaid family workers, domestic servants and
employees in microenterprises (less than five employees). ‡Percentage of the urban labour force occupied
with low productivity that is unskilled self-employed. §Percentage of the rural labour force that is self-
employed or unpaid family worker.
Source Author’s estimates based on ECLAC (2006b); and non-weighted averages.
from an average of 42 per cent of the urban labour
force in 1990 to 46 per cent circa 2005; whereas the
rural informal sector (self-employed and unpaid family
workers, in both agriculture and non-agriculture)
stagnated from 54.7 per cent to 55 per cent because
of growing urbanisation (based on ECLAC 2002,
2006a).
Table 1 shows the importance of total urban informal
labour, its major type (urban self-employed) and total
rural informal labour in 18 countries of the region
(data on Cuba and Haiti are not available). Countries
are divided into three groups (low, medium and high
informality), and ranked within each group from the
lowest to the highest level of informality. With few
exceptions, the most developed countries have the
lowest informality and the least developed the
highest informality. In the low group, the urban
informal sector averages 36 per cent, the urban self-
employed 19 per cent and informal rural labour
43 per cent, whereas the proportions in the middle
group increase to 46 per cent, 35 per cent and 50 per
cent, respectively, and in the high group proportions
peak at 56 per cent, 36 per cent and 66 per cent,
respectively.
Other urban informal types not disaggregated in the
table for lack of systematic data on coverage are:
domestic servants (averaging 6 per cent of the urban
labour force, probably underestimated, and ranging
from 2 per cent to 11 per cent – the latter being in
Peru); employees of microenterprises (averaging
12 per cent of the urban employed labour force, also
probably underestimated, and ranging from 7 per
cent in Chile to 17 per cent in Bolivia); and unpaid
family workers whose disaggregate proportion is
unknown (based on ECLAC 2006b).
The rural informal sector lacks any disaggregation:
Table 1 shows only self-employed and unpaid family
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Table 2 Latin American countries in the three informality groups ranked by social insurance coverage:
circa 2004
Importance of informal labour Coverage of labour force by Coverage of total population by 
force in countries pensions (%) health (%)
Low (average) 45 57
Chile 57 72




Brazil 45 – ‡
Mexico 28 45
Medium (average) 19 29
Colombia 22 53
Venezuela 21 38
El Salvador 20 16
Dominican Republic 14 7








*Argentina’s coverage fell sharply during the crisis but had improved by 2007. †Uruguay has a high coverage
by collective mutual-aid institutions instead of social insurance. ‡Brazil does not have health social insurance
but a public system with very high coverage.
Source Based on Table 1 and Mesa-Lago (2008a); averages by author.
workers combined. ECLAC does not provide
disaggregated data on agricultural workers outside of
large plantations, cooperative members and peasants.
Table 2 shows that, with few exceptions, coverage by
pension and healthcare social insurance is highest in
the group with low informality, declines in the
medium group and is lowest in the high group:
average pension coverage is 45 per cent in the low
informality group, 19 per cent in the middle and
15 per cent in the high group, whereas healthcare
coverage averages 57 per cent, 29 per cent and
17 per cent, respectively. Social insurance coverage is
directly correlated with formal employment and
inversely related with informality.
Reasons for the lower coverage in the informal
sector are related to the social insurance system
itself (legal exclusion or voluntary affiliation, heavy
financial contributions, see next section) and to the
characteristics of informal workers, albeit the sector
is not homogenous. These include: unstable jobs and
income; lower income relative to salaried formal
employees; lack of an employer among the self-
employed (hence the absence of the employer’s
contribution and of an agent to deduct the worker’s
contribution); employers in microenterprises who
easily evade affiliation; domestic servants that either
collude with their employers to evade or fail to
report the employer’s violation of affiliation because
of fear of dismissal; and difficulties to detect, enrol
and collect from informal workers. Among
agricultural workers outside of large plantations
reasons are: dispersion, lack of employer, unstable
work and very low income (particularly among
peasants, squatters, shareholders, etc.). Informal
workers may also have other more urgent, higher
priorities than to join social insurance such as food,
housing and their business. Last but not least, this
article shows that the higher the proportion of
informal workers in a country the more difficult it is
to cover them, and labour flexibility has aggravated
the lack of social insurance protection.
3 Social insurance legal and actual coverage of
informal workers
This section focuses on the factors obstructing
coverage of informal workers resulting from the
social insurance system itself: legal treatment and
financial conditions. We also relate those factors to
actual coverage as reported by statistics from social
insurance institutions, and give examples of policies
implemented in some countries to compensate for
the adverse system conditions (legal coverage from
legislation, actual coverage from Mesa-Lago 2007,
2008a,b).
The urban self-employed average 29 per cent of the
region’s employed urban labour force; they have legal
voluntary coverage on pensions in 14 countries; two
countries exclude them and four grant obligatory
coverage. On healthcare, 12 countries have voluntary
affiliation, four exclude them or do not enforce legal
mandatory affiliation, and only two have obligatory
coverage (in addition, in Brazil and Cuba public
universal systems cover these workers). Actual
coverage ranges from 0.1–30 per cent for pensions
and 0.2–15 per cent for healthcare. A great barrier to
coverage is a contribution equal to the sum of the
percentages paid by salaried workers and employers.
Conversely, domestic servants, which average 6 per
cent of the employed urban labour force, have legal
mandatory coverage in 12 countries for pensions and
in 13 for healthcare but in three countries, this has
little effect. Actual coverage ranges from 3–39 per
cent for pensions and 3–31 per cent for healthcare,
because many of these workers lack labour
contracts; are unable to denounce evasion or
conspire with the employer to evade.
Employees in microenterprises (an average of 12 per
cent of the employed urban labour force) are often
not covered as the law sets a minimum number of
employees (5–10) for mandatory affiliation in
enterprises. Coverage in microenterprises is between
one-third and one-thirtieth of coverage in large
enterprises. Even when coverage is mandatory, social
insurance institutions neglect inspection to detect
evasion by small enterprises because of the higher
costs involved and concentrate on the easier and
cheaper collection among larger enterprises.
Unpaid family members are normally excluded from
coverage both in pension and healthcare
programmes.
Only three countries provide full mandatory legal
pension coverage to agricultural workers; the rest
impose restrictions or have special regimes. These
workers are legally excluded from health coverage in
half of the countries; the other half covers mainly
wage earners in large plantations and members of
cooperatives in some countries. Self-employed
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peasants, sharecroppers, squatters etc. are normally
excluded in both programmes. The proportion of the
agricultural labour force that is insured for pensions
oscillates between 4 per cent and 12 per cent in five
countries; coverage of the rural population usually is
one-third to one-sixth that of the urban population.
Only three countries have introduced special social
insurance pensions for rural workers or peasants
covering 18 per cent of the rural labour force in
Ecuador, 29 per cent in Mexico and 50 per cent in
Brazil. Very few figures are available on health
coverage of agricultural workers: 1.5 per cent in
Ecuador (but 18 per cent of the rural population is
covered by peasant insurance), 2 per cent in
Honduras and 6 per cent in Mexico (where 29 per
cent of the rural population is covered by peasant
insurance).
In an attempt to explore the potential role of the
system characteristics on coverage, Table 3 compares
in selected countries, the stipulated legal mandatory or
voluntary pensions coverage (the existence of special
regimes for agricultural workers/peasants in some
countries) for three types of informal worker (urban
self-employed, domestic servants and agricultural
workers/peasants) with their actual coverage. Table 3
adds the share of each of these groups of informal
workers relative to the labour force.
Table 3 suggests that countries with mandatory
insurance have considerably higher coverage than
those with voluntary affiliation. For instance, among
the self-employed, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
have obligatory affiliation and cover 23–30 per cent
of these workers, whereas those with voluntary
affiliation only cover 0.1–10 per cent (Chile after 25
years of a structural pension reform only covers 5 per
cent of the self-employed, mainly professionals with
high incomes). An exception is Costa Rica that had
voluntary affiliation until 2006 but covered 24 per
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Table 3 Share of types of informal workers, and their legal and statistical pension coverage in selected
countries, circa 2004
Type of informal Type of informal/employed Legal pension coverage % of type of 
workers/countries labour force (%) informal covered
Self-employed
Argentina 17 Obligatory 30
Brazil 23 Obligatory 23
Chile 15 Voluntary 5
Colombia 38 Voluntary 10
Costa Rica 16 Voluntary 24
Mexico 19 Voluntary 0.1
Nicaragua 35 Voluntary 0.2
Paraguay 30 Voluntary 0.2
Uruguay 20 Obligatory 29
Domestic servants
Brazil 9 Obligatory 27
Costa Rica 5 Obligatory 39
Paraguay 11 Voluntary 3
Agriculture/peasants*
Brazil 54 Special regime 50
Chile 23 Obligatory 41
Costa Rica 10 Obligatory salaried 44
Ecuador 48 Special regime 18
El Salvador 21 Large farms only 6
Honduras 44 Obligatory 10+employees 2
Mexico 18 Special regime 29
*Percentage of the rural labour force that are self-employed and unpaid family workers in agriculture.
Source Mesa-Lago (2008b); first column from Table 1; agriculture/peasants from ECLAC (2006).
cent of the self-employed for pensions because the
state subsidised the low-income self-employed,
matching their contribution with that of the
employer they lacked.2 Similarly, among domestic
servants, Brazil and Costa Rica have obligatory
affiliation and reach 27–29 per cent coverage,
whereas Paraguay with voluntary affiliation covers
only 3 per cent. Among agricultural workers and
peasants, countries with obligatory affiliation such as
Chile and Costa Rica (for all salaried) cover 41–44 per
cent, those with special regimes such as Brazil,
Ecuador and Mexico cover 50 per cent, 18 per cent
and 29 per cent, respectively, but El Salvador and
Honduras with significant restrictions only cover 2–6
per cent. Nevertheless, the apparent positive
relationship between mandatory coverage/special
regimes and coverage may be also influenced by the
proportion of informal workers in the labour force,
thus countries with the highest coverage are those
with the lowest informality and vice versa. Finally,
the legal mandate for affiliation may not by itself
improve coverage if the state fails to provide the
needed subsidies to low-income informal workers.
To reach more sound conclusions, more research is
needed along with better statistics on informal
workers and their coverage.
The healthcare system, rather than being neutral, can
determine the degree of exclusion, for instance a
segmented or highly segmented system without
coordination and poor solidarity is typical of all
countries with low coverage. In the least developed
(high informality group) social insurance was
introduced late, in some of these coverage has not
yet expanded to all geographic areas (health facilities
and personnel are concentrated in the capital city
and urban areas), and several of them have large
rural and indigenous populations which are difficult
to incorporate. Furthermore, these countries endure
a regressive distribution of health funds, allocating
more to social insurance and private sectors than to
the public sector that is legally in charge of the
protection of the majority of the population, and the
poor and low-income are burdened with out-of-
pocket expenses. Conversely, countries with fairly
unified and coordinated healthcare systems and
solidarity have achieved higher coverage: social
insurance in Costa Rica, Chile and Panama, and
public systems in Brazil and Cuba.
In summary, the higher the proportion of informal
workers in the labour force, the more difficult it is to
cover them; countries that have legal obligatory
affiliation have higher coverage than those with
voluntary affiliation; fiscal subsidies to the low-
income self-employed and similar groups provide
incentives for affiliation; special regimes for rural
workers or peasants have better coverage than those
with voluntary or restricted coverage; countries with
relatively unified and/or coordinated healthcare
systems have better coverage than those with
segmented or highly segmented systems without
coordination. More research is needed to separate
internal factors (induced by the system) and external
factors such as the size of informality and the
characteristics of these workers, and other factors
discussed in the next section.
4 Inequalities in coverage, and protection of the
poor and the elderly
Social insurance coverage is also influenced by other
factors, such as income, education, gender, degree of
development, location and ethnicity. There is a
positive relationship between coverage on the one
hand and income, education, male gender, high
degree of development, urban location and non-
indigenous ethnicity on the other hand (see Mesa-
Lago 2008a).
The lower the income and education of the person,
the lower his/her social insurance coverage and vice
versa.
Gender inequalities in coverage are caused by
external and system factors: in one-quarter of Latin-
American countries, the female spouse is legally
covered for maternity but not sickness or vice versa.
Statistical coverage of women is lower than men,
due to indirect insurance as a spouse dependent on
the male insured. Direct access declines as women
exit the labour force to raise children. Pension
coverage of elderly women is much lower than
among elderly men in most countries.
The best-covered geographic areas are the most
developed, urbanised and wealthier, whereas the
worst covered are the least developed, rural and
poor. Only two countries have compensation funds
to reduce geographic inequalities in healthcare.
Indigenous populations are largely excluded from
coverage because they are poor or have low-income,
work in the informal sector and/or live in rural areas.
The three countries that have special programmes
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for rural and peasants have been able to cover part
of them.
Poverty averaged 39.8 per cent of the population in
2005 and ranged from 47–75 per cent in nine
countries (ECLAC 2006b).3 Only six, the most
developed with the lowest poverty incidence
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and
Uruguay), have targeted means-tested social
assistance pensions but these do not cover all the
poor. Thirteen countries lack social assistance
pensions and they suffer the lowest coverage of
contributory programmes and the highest poverty
incidence. Bolivia with 64 per cent poor has a non-
targeted universal flat pension granted to part of
those who get a contributory pension. And yet social
assistance pensions have significantly reduced
poverty. International financial organisations have
given priority in the last decade to the mandatory
private savings ‘pillar’ and seriously neglected the
poverty-prevention public ‘pillar’; a group of Bank
officials have now recommended a reversal in such
priorities (Gill et al. 2005). A Chilean legal draft
currently under discussion in the parliament creates a
universal basic pension for the population in the
lowest 60 per cent of income. Estimates of costs of
supplementary means-tested schemes indicate that
they are financially viable and would reduce poverty
by about 18 percentage points (ECLAC 2006a).
Coverage of the elderly population (age 65 and
above) by pensions is worst in the least developed
countries (5–20 per cent in Bolivia, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay) and
best in the most developed countries (62–87 per
cent in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and
Uruguay). In three of the latter, coverage has
declined through time: Argentina, Chile (in the
contributory programme but compensated by social
assistance pensions) and Uruguay (Rofman 2005;
Mesa-Lago 2008a). Such evidence is contrary to the
World Bank prediction that poverty among old
people will decrease over time in the region (Gill et
al. 2005). Actually the noted decline in coverage of
the active labour force in most countries is resulting
in decreasing protection of the elderly cohort of the
population that is rapidly growing in the region.
Social insurance pensioners in all countries (except
Haiti) are entitled to health coverage, but in
Nicaragua they receive a mini package of benefits
which is considerably lower than for active insured
workers.
5 Conclusions and lessons from Latin America
for other developing countries
5.1 Factors that influence coverage
Low and stagnant or declining social insurance
coverage in the region is shaped by: (1) the
transformation of the labour market; (2) the lack of
adaptation of social insurance to such change in
most countries; (3) the failure of most systems and
reforms to design programmes capable of expanding
coverage, largely due to the exclusion of informal-
rural workers and the poor, and (4) external factors.
The higher the proportional size of informal–rural
groups in the labour force, the more difficult they
are to cover, but some countries have implemented
successful inclusion policies, mainly the most
developed.
Social insurance pension programmes and reforms
(particularly but not exclusively private systems) were
originally designed for urban formal workers, with
stable jobs, medium–high salary and high density of
contribution (most of them male), but the majority
of the labour force in the region is informal and/or
agricultural, with unstable employment, low wages
and poor density of contribution (especially among
women), hence coverage is very difficult to extend.
Segmented healthcare systems without coordination
and poor solidarity are typical of all countries with
low coverage; in the least developed, social insurance
was introduced late, some have not expanded
coverage to all geographic areas, and several have
large rural and indigenous populations that are
difficult to incorporate.
External factors in addition to labour-market
transformation are: underdevelopment, elevated
poverty incidence, gender inequality, cultural and
ethnic barriers, a large rural population, poorly
developed regions, lack of government commitment,
and scarce or improperly assigned fiscal resources.
5.2 Policies
Expansion of coverage
The idea that development will eventually expand
the formal sector and thus extend coverage is
contradicted by factual evidence in Latin America
over the last 25 years. Social insurance, therefore,
must adapt to the transformation of the labour
market, expanding coverage to informal and rural
workers and peasants, the poor and the elderly.
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Incorporation of difficult groups
Countries that have legal obligatory affiliation have
higher coverage than those with voluntary affiliation
but legal inclusion by itself is insufficient: fiscal
subsidies to the low-income self-employed and
similar groups provide incentives for affiliation (Costa
Rica); special regimes for rural workers or peasants
get better coverage than those with voluntary or
restricted coverage but with diverse results due to
diverse government commitment and financial
support (better in Brazil than Mexico and Ecuador).
Reduction of inequalities require
Integration or good coordination between the public
and social insurance sectors in segmented health
systems to eliminate overlapping, save resources, and
extend coverage to those excluded; granting fiscal
subsidies to poor or low-income groups (as in Chile)
or to guarantee the basic package of health benefits
in the entire system regardless of age, gender and
risk (as in Colombia and Argentina); making financing
proportional to income or progressive as income
increases; elimination of fiscal subsidies awarded to
non-poor (free riders); extension of legal
comprehensive health coverage to the spouse of the
insured, granting optional insurance to housewives
and bonuses to women that exit the labour force to
raise their children; and priority to cover indigenous
peoples targeting the geographic areas where they
live.
Poverty and the elderly
Priority should be given to the poverty prevention
pillar through social assistance pensions targeted on
the poor, which are less costly than universal non-
targeted pensions. Increasing coverage of the active
labour force will improve coverage of the elderly in
the long run.
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Notes
1 Structural reforms passed in Ecuador and
Nicaragua failed to be implemented due to
annulment or declaration of unconstitutionality.
2 Obligatory affiliation began for pensions in 2006
and should have increased coverage. Similar state
subsidies for low-income self-employed in
healthcare social insurance increased coverage to
45 per cent of that group.
3 ECLAC (2007) preliminary estimates indicate an
astonishing cut of ten percentage points in
poverty incidence between 2005 (39.8 per cent)
and 2006 (29.8 per cent) largely influenced by
significant cuts in the three countries with the
largest populations: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
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